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EXPERIMENTS IN POLICE DISCRETION:
SCIENTIFIC BOON OR DANGEROUS
KNOWLEDGE?*
LAWRENCE W. SHERMANt
I
INTRODUCTION
"If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold." -Justice
Brandeis, dissenting in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann'
Scientific experimentation holds the potential for revolutionizing police
discretion. 2 It has already begun to erode the ignorance police have of the
consequences of their actions after they leave an encounter. Science may
soon be able to guide the discretionary allocation of scarce criminal justice
resources to those offenders who are most deterrable, as well as to those who
commit the most offenses. Science may also be able to tell police when not to
act, if their actions would produce more harmful consequences than benefits.
Before rushing headlong into a brave new world of scientifically based
police discretion, one must carefully consider its implications. Detailed
knowledge of the consequences of police discretion in a wide range of situa-
tions could produce dangerous forms of inequity and discrimination. More-
over, that "knowledge" may be faulty in its application to particular cases.
Yet, attempts to refine the knowledge to produce more accurate predictions in
particular cases may produce even greater dangers of discrimination.
This article describes the problem that experiments in police discretion
may solve, the experiments themselves, and the problems their findings may
create. It articulates three familiar value models of police work that can be
used to examine the uses or abuses of knowledge about the consequences of
police discretion. Finally, it uses those models to examine the implications of
(1) not knowing the consequences of police decisions, (2) knowing the average
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effects of a police action on all kinds of people, and (3) knowing the differential
effects of the same police action on different kinds of people in different
circumstances.
II
THE LIMITS OF INTUITIVE POLICE KNOWLEDGE
What is the best way to handle a bar fight? What should police do when
one neighbor threatens violence against another? What action should police
take with juveniles suspected of vandalism or burglary? How should police
deal with a man tampering with a car he does not own? When should police
arrest, mediate, cajole, threaten, investigate, warn, laugh, or do nothing?
Some of these techniques are no doubt more effective than others in different
situations, but how should police match the response to the situation? Police
make such judgments all the time; however, they may often err, measured by
the short or long term consequences of their actions.
What do police officers know about the discretion they exercise? They say
they know a great deal. 3 They say that experience is the best teacher and that
it helps to give them excellent judgment. Some police officers also contradict
themselves, saying that every situation they confront is unique, that one
cannot generalize, and that there are no predictable patterns of human
behavior that can be discovered through scientific research.
No scientist should belittle the learning that comes from experience, how-
ever unsystematic. 4 Experience, after all, is the foundation of empiricism and
the antidote to superstition, religion, or dogma as a source of truth about the
physical world.5 Direct experience, however, is better than indirect experi-
ence, and both are better than assumptions. The problem with experience as
a basis for exercising police discretion is that it provides incomplete informa-
tion with respect to each series of encounters. Police suffer a "funnel effect"
of experience; as time passes, they have less and less knowledge about how
their actions have affected a situation:
1. They have direct experience with people's responses to their behavior while
officers and citizens are still physically present;
2. If some other officer gets a repeat call, involving the same parties, the officers who
first responded may have indirect experience of what the effects of their actions may
be after they leave the scene but during the same shift;
3. Generally, officers have only assumptions and no information about what effect
their actions had on the people over the next day, week, month or year.
Police in small towns may know a good deal about what happens to all the
people with whom they deal. Most police officers and most crimes, however,
are concentrated in big cities, where the police and the public are largely
3. See generally Bayley & Bittner, Learning the Skills of Policing, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1984, at 35.
4. See C. LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE 10-29 (1979) (comparing and relating
"professional social inquiry," or scientific decisionmaking, to other ways of decisionmaking).
5. See D. BOORSTIN, THE DISCOVERERS 146-48 (1983) (describing how maps based on the exper-
iences of sailors replaced maps based on theology).
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unknown to each other. The urban police may deal with people in the most
intimate settings concerning major events in their lives, and then never see
those people again. That is not the fault of the individual officers. If fault
exists, it is the consequence of the social organization of modern American
police work.
The telephone and the patrol car have stripped police of their information
base, shaping police work into a reactive mechanism for distributing legiti-
mate coercive force. 6 The police mission is defined as answering calls and
being available to answer more calls. Police managers have created only an
input information system, which tells police where to respond right away.
They have failed to create afeedback information system which tells police what
happens after they leave, or even after they make an arrest. In many cities, for
example, police have no idea whether their arrests result in convictions or
prison sentences. Police managers have failed also to create an intelligence
system, which would provide contextual or background knowledge to help
police better use their experience to predict the consequences of exercising
their discretion in various ways.
The scope of police information systems limits intuitive police knowledge
regarding the effects of their actions. Salespeople can develop intuitive
knowledge about how to sell because they know when they have made the sale
or not. Police officers cannot develop comparable knowledge because they
never find out whether they "made a sale": whether the bar fight resulted in
no subsequent acts of vengeance, whether the husband stopped beating his
family, or whether the threat to attack a neighbor was carried out.
Compare the police to medieval masons or carpenters. Those craftsmen
used discretion in constructing buildings. If the buildings later fell down,
they probably heard about it. Compare police to early navigators. The navi-
gators used discretion and guesswork to plot a course. If they landed on
shoals, or in the wrong country, they received immediate feedback on the
effects of their discretion. Any of the great crafts created without science had
the same characteristic: immediate feedback on the aftermath (if not the caus-
ally related consequence) of a discretionary action. Police work has been
called a craft,7 but such a term overstates the feedback police receive on the
aftermath of their craftmanship.
Police information systems not only fail to give feedback on the aftermath
of police actions, but also fail to keep track of the "treatments," or police
actions, taken by other officers. Police interacting with suspects and victims
within an information vacuum is comparable to a doctor treating a patient
without a medical chart. The officer at the scene has no idea whether another
officer was there yesterday or last week, or what the officer did. The two
officers may respond to the same problem in contradictory ways, canceling
6. Sherman, "1Watching" and Crime Prevention, J. CONTEMP. STUD., Fall 1982, at 87, 89-90; see A.
REISSJR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 2-5 (1971). See generally E. BrrrNER, supra note 2, at 36-48, 89-
92.
7. J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 283 (.1968).
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out any good effects or perhaps making matters worse. Just as different doc-
tors, if they do not read a patient's chart, may prescribe different drugs that
could interact to kill the patient, police can do great harm because they have
no chart to read. Computer terminals in police cars may solve this problem in
the future, if the terminals are ever programmed creatively to provide such
information.
The absence of feedback, intelligence, and treatment information systems
for police is hardly accidental. Many people prefer a society in which police
are structured into systematic ignorance. Any debate on the merits of that
ignorance, however, should consider the full range of its consequences.
Moreover, the police themselves cannot credibly claim that experience is an
adequate basis for their exercise of discretion when they are denied the infor-
mation required to give them the necessary experience.
Suppose police acquired the necessary experience. Would that experience
be sufficient? Would good feedback about the aftermath of police actions
allow officers to learn to predict with some accuracy the effects of their
actions? It probably would not. Given the complexity of human behavior (in
contrast to, for example, the simple physics of carpentry), the effects of police
actions are not likely to be determined only by the nature of the actions them-
selves. The consequences of police actions may depend on how those actions
interacted with factors such as a suspect's age, sex, relationship to victim, edu-
cation, employment, criminal history, church attendance, or even diet., It is
unlikely that police officers, or anyone, could make sense of these complex
interaction effects without systematic statistical controls. Just as trial lawyers
have learned how to pick a good jury through experience, police may learn
how to use discretion better if they obtained better feedback. Some trial law-
yers, however, now supplement their intuitive conclusions with systematic jury
research. Police, similarly, could well supplement their experience with statis-
tical research.
In any case, police clearly lack reliable knowledge about the effects of their
discretionary actions on suspects, victims, witnesses, and potential criminals.
Whether better feedback could give police better knowledge is a moot ques-
tion, since it seems unlikely they will develop better information systems in
the near future. What seems more likely is that scientific experiments will
provide police with more reliable predictions than individual experience
could produce, even if better feedback systems were developed.
III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISCRETION RESEARCH
The contribution of science to police discretion has followed a classic pat-
tern of development from description to explanation to prediction. The
descriptive research began in the 1950's with the American Bar Foundation
8. See, e.g., G. NETrLER, EXPLAINING CRIME (1984).
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(ABF) field studies of criminal justice in three states. 9 The ABF research dis-
covered that police were playing a judicial, rather than ministerial, role in
deciding when to make arrests, and that arrest and detention were being used
for purposes other than prosecution.' 0 The ABF discovery apparently
shocked legal scholars," l but the police managed to avoid major repercus-
sions by refusing to acknowledge the findings.
The police got into bigger trouble during the civil rights movement from
the claim that police were biased against minorities. This social context
directed the discretion research of the 1960's to explanations of police
behavior based on suspect characteristics, rather than explanations of suspect
behavior based on police actions. Observational studies i2 in the mid-1960's
and early 1970's, showing blacks more likely to be arrested than whites (with a
complex array of intervening variables), were replicated in different cities in
1977 with similar results.' 3 Quite apart from any scientific findings, activists
had assumed for twenty years that discrimination existed. Nonetheless, the
question of how to prevent discriminatory discretion remained unanswered,
largely for lack of ideas about methods of controlling use of discretion by
police.
By the 1980's, the scientific agenda on police discretion clearly had shifted
to the consequences of discretion and away from its causes. In a major con-
ceptual statement, Professor Herman Goldstein called for a problem-oriented
approach to improving policing.' 4 Goldstein's argument laid the foundation
for solving the problem of police ignorance regarding the consequences of
their actions and for going beyond the limits of intuitive police knowledge.
Goldstein's suggestion was to take specific crime and order problems, assess
the various ways police could deal with them, and determine which ones work
best. The clear implication of this proposal is use of the scientific experiment.
The classic scientific experiment can produce more conclusive findings
about causal connections between two variables than can any other research
method. Not only is it a better method than raw experience for developing
predictions, but it is also better than most other methods of conducting
formal research. As a recent report to ChiefJustice Burger points out, experi-
ments rule out both systematic and chance differences between groups
receiving different treatment by the criminal justice system, so that any subse-
quent differences in their behavior will be caused (most likely) by the criminal
9. See Smith & Stason, Preface to W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSTODY at ix-xi (1965).
10. W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 437-38.
11. E.g., Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the CriminalJustice Process: Low Visibility Decisions in
the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 586-88 (1960) (urging full enforcement of all laws with
legislative repeal of obsolete or unenforced laws).
12. These studies are reviewed in Sherman, Causes of Police Behavior: The Current State of Quantita-
tive Research, 17J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQ. 69 (1980); see also D. BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUS-
TOMS OF THE POLICE (1980) (citing studies mentioned in text in describing police behavior).
13. Smith & Visher, Street Level Justice: Situational Determinants of Police Arrest Decisions, 29 Soc.
PROBS. 167, 172 (1981).
14. Goldstein, Inproving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25 CRIME & DELINQ. 236 (1979).
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justice actions.15 This causal link between groups' behavior and criminal jus-
tice actions is hard to determine merely by analyzing people treated differ-
ently for "natural" reasons. People who get longer sentences, for example,
may commit more crimes upon release than those who get shorter sentences.
Does that mean that longer sentences increase recidivism, or that more recidi-
vistic people get longer sentences? Analysis of such natural differences
cannot determine causation, but experiments can.
Experiments are especially powerful when they use random (i.e., lottery)
assignment on large numbers of individuals. They are less powerful-and
less properly called experiments-when they are conducted with a small
number of people or without random assignment. Many problems in policing
are unfortunately of this character. Assessing the effects of preventive patrol,
for example, cannot be done at an individual level of analysis but only by
neighborhood. 16 There are not enough neighborhoods or resources available
to most police agencies to select randomly from large numbers of neighbor-
hoods. As a result, the reliability of any experiments conducted would be
somewhat weakened.
Most police officer discretion (as opposed to managerial policy discretion),
fortunately, is exercised in situational contexts with individuals. Random
experiments are not only feasible for discovering the consequences of discre-
tion, but are also more appropriate for studying discretion than for studying
other police problems.
Two random experiments dealing with the discretion to arrest have been
launched in the 1980's, both under my direction: the Minneapolis spouse
assault experiment and the department store shoplifting experiment. The
Minneapolis experiment was completed in 1983, and the department store
experiment is scheduled for completion in 1985. Their design and findings
illustrate the kind of knowledge that experiments can produce and the bene-
fits and costs of having such knowledge.
The Minneapolis experiment' 7 assembled more than forty police officers
who volunteered to give up their discretion for over a year in cases of simple
domestic assault where the suspect was still present at the scene. Instead of
deciding whether to arrest on the basis of their best judgment-or as studies
in other cities suggest, on the basis of victim preference, suspect race, suspect
demeanor, and size of the audience present' 8-the officers agreed to follow a
random numbers formula (a lottery procedure) in deciding what to do. They
had three options in the formula: arresting the suspect, "ordering" the
15. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY COMM. ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW, EXPERIMENTA-
TION IN THE LAW 17-18 (1981).
16. G. KELLING, T. PATE, D. DIECKMAN & C. BROWN, THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL
EXPERIMENT (1974).
17. See Sherman & Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc. REV.
261 (1984).
18. D. BLACK, supra note 12, at 85; R. Friedrich, The Impact of Organizational, Individual and
Situational Factors on Police Behavior (1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, available at University
of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Dept. of Political Science); Smith & Visher, supra note 13, at 168, 172-73.
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suspect to leave for eight hours, or just talking (in a wide variety of ways) to
the parties and leaving the scene. After each encounter, interviewers
attempted to interview the victim every two weeks for a six-month follow-up
period. The victims were asked whether subsequent violence or other
problems had occurred since the police encounter. Official data were also
tracked to see if any officers (whether or not they were in the experiment) had
filled out a new offense report on or made an arrest in that household for
domestic violence.
The results were striking. The arrested suspects, according to the victim
interviews, were half as likely to have repeated their violence during the six-
month follow-up as those who were ordered from the scene. Likewise,
according to the official data, the arrested suspects were half as likely to have
repeated their violence as the suspects who were only "advised." Both ways
of measuring the consequences of police actions showed that arrest produced
the lowest risk of new violence, even without other criminal justice sanctions.
Since only four out of the 136 arrests produced any formal fine or other pun-
ishment imposed by a judge, the violence reduction can be attributed to the
deterrent effect of arrest alone. 19
The experiment was also interesting for what it did not find: that the
effects of arrest were different for different kinds of people. It found that
arrest had virtually the same deterrent effects for Native Americans, blacks,
and whites, for employed and unemployed, and for suspects of different edu-
cation and income levels. In statistical terms, the analysis found no interac-
tion effects between police actions and suspect characteristics. Indeed, the
only detectable interaction effect in the entire analysis involved an officer char-
acteristic: whether the officer (according to the victim) took the time to listen
to the victim's story before taking action. When the officers reportedly lis-
tened to the problems, the deterrent effect was enhanced; when they did not,
the deterrent effect was greatly reduced. 20
The absence in the Minneapolis experiment of statistically detectable
effects of interaction between police actions and suspect characteristics is not
conclusive. The sample size of about 300, with only 150 complete interview
sets, was too small, and the distribution of key variables too lopsided to pro-
vide a reasonable likelihood of detecting any differences in deterrability
among kinds of individuals. In statistical terms, these methodological weak-
nesses create a risk of Type II error, or a bias in favor of the null hypothesis; 2 1
the lack of adequate statistical power in a data set makes it possible to reject a
hypothesis even when it should not be rejected and would not be rejected if
sufficient power were available. 2 2
19. Sherman & Berk, supra note 17, at 270.
20. Sherman & Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, in POLICE FOUNDATION 1, 6
(1984).
21. H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 112-16, 159 (1972).
22. Id. at 167.
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Our department store shoplifting arrest experiment should avoid the
problem of inadequate statistical power. Beginning in August of 1983, a
major department store agreed to call the police to arrest every other person
apprehended by store investigators for shoplifting. The experiment called for
a continuation of this procedure until 1500 people had been apprehended.
Both the arrested and the released shoplifters are to be followed up with
department store and police records, and both will be interviewed six months
to a year after the apprehension and asked how much more shoplifting they
have done. The two groups will then be compared for the frequency and
dollar value of their post-apprehension thefts. 23 The findings may help
department stores determine the cost-effectiveness of calling the police and
paying store investigators to go to court to testify against the shoplifters.
In addition, the findings may show something more. With a sample size of
1500, the department store experiment will have sufficient statistical power to
detect interaction effects. The experiment should determine whether some
kinds of people are more likely than others to be deterred from shoplifting as
a result of being arrested. Differences between teenagers and adults, house-
wives and working women, churchgoers and nonchurchgoers, Catholics and
Protestants, blacks and whites, and men and women should all be detectable
in the analysis. Such differences may not exist. Because there are major dif-
ferences among some such groups in their measured involvement in commit-
ting crime, 24 however, it seems unlikely that there would be no difference
among them in deterrability. The commission of crime is by definition an
absence of deterrence, or perhaps even a backfiring of attempts to deter. If
labeling theory2 5 is correct for at least some types of offenders, then the
experiment may also show that arrest increases the frequency of shoplifting
for such people.
If experiments in police discretion continue to create such knowledge we
may soon have three classes of police-citizen encounters. The largest class
would be the ignorance group, or those situations for which no experiments
have yet been conducted. The second class would be the equity group, or
those situations for which the available experiments show that one police
action works best for everyone, regardless of personal characteristics. The
third class of encounters would be the differentiation group, in which the avail-
able experiments show that different police actions are more or less effective
for different kinds of people. How we view the policy implications of each of
these three classes of encounters depends on the values and goals we hold for
the police in a free society dedicated to equality under the law.
23. L. Sherman, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest: A Field Experiment (1982) (unpub-
lished proposal submitted to the National Institute of Justice).
24. Hindelang, Race and Involvement in Common Law Personal Crimes, 43 AM. Soc. REV. 93 (1978).
25. See the review of labeling theory in Sherman & Berk, supra note 17, at 261-62, 269.
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IV
THREE PHILOSOPHICAL MODELS OF POLICE WORK
Professor Packer's classic analysis of the antinomy between the due pro-
cess and crime control models ofjustice suggests the virtue of exploring value
assumptions in public policy. 26 Discussions of police discretion rarely articu-
late such value premises, which nevertheless underlie many disagreements.
Table I summarizes some important questions of value in police discretion
and the answers to those questions implied by three different ways of thinking
about discretion. These abstract models of analysis are all derived from var-
ious writings and discussions on these issues, so in one sense they have an
empirical referent. They are nonetheless "ideal types" not necessarily found
in this exact form in nature.
One model for thinking about the police is the formal, legalistic premise
that police are bound by the letter of the law; they are mere ministers of the
state charged with executing its edicts unthinkingly. This ministerial model
contrasts sharply with the policejustice model that police executives have articu-
lated in recent years, according to which police are defined as highly trained
experts capable of making complex decisions about how best to produce jus-
tice, just like prosecutors and judges. The concern with justice for its own
sake differentiates this model from the professional crime control position, which
uses doctors rather than lawyers for a model: the police should control dis-
ease (crime) the best way possible, rather than just dispense medicine (justice)
regardless of its effectiveness.
The ministerial model originates in legislative conceptions of the police
task. It is the basis for the various full enforcement laws and the penalties for
an officer's failure to make an arrest when a crime is witnessed 27 and is the
preference of one member of the ABF research group. 28 It is espoused by
one commentator who has recently argued that police are morally obliged to
enforce all the laws with full powers, if only to create pressure to reduce the
scope of the criminal law. 29 For the most part, however, the ministerial model
is a straw man. Police discretion has been so widely discussed for the past two
decades that many people take it for granted, despite the fact that its exercise
is an apparent violation of many statutes. Policymakers accept discretion
uncritically, focusing only on the question of how to shape and control it.
Table 1 portrays the straw man in its full glory. The model values a virtual
ban on decisions not to enforce the law if evidence legally sufficient for
26. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 153-73 (1968).
27. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-142 (1981); see also H. GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 108
(1977) (commenting that most states require the police to enforce all laws and referring specifically
to the D.C. statute). But see D. BLACK, supra note 12, at 90 (noting that police observed in 1966 in
three cities, including Washington, made arrests in only 58% of the encounters with felony suspects
and 44% of the encounters with misdemeanor suspects).
28. See Goldstein, supra note 11, at 586-87. But cf W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 492-95 (recog-
nizing that police use discretion and urging evaluation of how they do and should use it).
29. Interview with William Heffernan, John Jay College (March 1981).
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enforcement is present. Like Packer's due process model, 30 its goal is justice
and its presumption is the innocence of the suspect. Like Packer's crime con-
trol model,3' it is driven by a general preference aimed at deterrence, for the
greatest possible likelihood of sanctioning each crime that occurs. It tolerates
neither police judgments about a person's character nor any priorities related
to scarce enforcement resources as a basis for deciding not to arrest. The law
is the law, and that is it. First offenders, career criminals, sassy kids and polite
grandfathers should all be treated equally by police according to the evidence
available. Any judgments on these criteria should be made by the prosecutor,
who is legally invested with discretionary power, not by the police. "Justice"
in any sense is therefore removed from police hands and given to other offi-
cials to dispense.
TABLE 1
THREE PHILOSOPHICAL MODELS OF POLICE WORK
Value Questions Model
Ministerial Police Professional
Justice Justice Crime Control
1. Should police exercise discretion
at all? No Yes Yes
2. Should police seek justice for its
own sake, rather than for crime
control? Yes Yes No
3. Should police presume guilt of
most suspects? No Yes Yes
4. Should the criminal sanction be
applied to as much crime as
possible? Yes Yes No
5. Should police pursue specific,
rather than general, deterrence? No No Yes
6. Should police pursue crime
control goals whatever the moral
worth of the suspect? Yes No Yes
7. Should scarce prosecution
resources be focused only on the
most deterrable offenders (or
those most likely to be
incapacitated)? No No Yes
Police officers and administrators in the 1980's generally would not accept
the ministerial model. Police thinkers ever since Vollmer 32 have cultivated
the notion of police work as a profession. There can be no professionalism,
however, where there is no discretion to be guided by professional exper-
30. H. PACKER, supra note 26, at 164-67.
31. See id. at 158-60.
32. A. VOLLMER, THE POLICE AND MODERN SOCIETY (1936).
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tise.33 Acknowledging discretion is central to enhancing the prestige of the
police, and courts have recognized officers' professional discretionary deci-
sions. 34 The police justice model, however, has been more retributivist than
utilitarian. As with Packer's crime control model, the police justice model is
concerned with punishing criminals. The moral zeal of the police inclines
them toward vengeance on behalf of victims and the society as a whole. Thus,
advocates of the police justice model share the ministerial model's disregard
of scarce criminal justice resources, faith in the wisdom of pushing arrest rates
for all offenses as high as possible, and disregard for specific deterrence (or
even such heresy as labeling theory)3 5 considerations. Their conception of
justice is primarily retribution or just deserts, but is based on the offender
rather than on the offense. The police justice model parts company with the
ministerial model on the individuation of vengeance (not crime control per
se), which supports the officer's right to use his judgment of relative moral
worth. Since most suspects presumably are guilty, and since police cannot
possibly arrest them all, it is no less fitting for police than for judges to con-
sider character in deciding what treatment a suspect "deserves." Insults to a
police officer, like insults to a judge, are properly relevant facts to consider in
deciding what action to take.
Curiously, this police justice model-which most police appear to
espouse-is not a crime reduction model. It views policing much more as an
end than as a means. Police arrest, harass, or move along some people and
not others because those people merit such treatment in moral terms, not
because such treatment makes society a better place or achieves the greatest
good for the greatest number. Any deterrent effects of policing in this model,
either specific or general, are merely by-products of justice as police define it.
A third conception of the goals of policing has been suggested by Herman
Goldstein,3 6 the American Bar Association project on criminal justice stan-
dards and goals,3 7 and others.3 8 This conception holds that police face a wide
range of problems and should use the most effective means to solve them.
Even if a problem includes violations of the law, the crime control model
assumes that arrest and prosecution may not necessarily be the most desirable
or effective way to deal with the problem. This model is pragmatic and utilita-
rian, using arrest only as a means to the end of crime control. There is no
virtue to "justice" if it merely creates more crime.
The professional crime control model thus shares the police justice
model's support for discretion and implicitly shares the working assumption
33. See Hughes, Professions in THE PROFESSIONS IN AMERICA 1, 2-3 (K. Lynn ed. 1965).
34. E.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297-99 (1978).
35. "Labeling Theory" claims that the imposition of punishment enhances, rather than reduces,
the likelihood of repeat offending. See, e.g., E. LEMERT, HUMAN DEVIANCE, SOCIAL PROBLEMS, AND
SOCIAL CONTROL (1972).
36. Goldstein, supra note 14, at 241-43.
37. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION §§ 1.1(b), 2.2, 3.2 (1973).
38. Bayley & Bittner, supra note 3, at 35-36.
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that most suspects are guilty (at least for the many minor offenses for which
police use discretion). The two models differ on everything else. The crime
control model is skeptical about the effectiveness of the criminal sanction in
shaping behavior. It is more concerned with the future conduct of individual
suspects than with the conduct of the hypothetical audience viewing police
treatment of the suspect; that audience, however, is unlikely to learn how the
suspect actually was treated.39 The crime control model views individuation
of treatment by "moral worth" as professional malpractice, just as different
medical care according to doctors' judgments of patents' moral worth would
be. The model does support individuation of treatment according to "what
works." If criminal justice resources are scarce, it makes sense to save arrests
for those who can be deterred or incapacitated. If an arrest has little chance
of reducing individual risks of recidivism, then a crime control model does not
require arrest.
There are admittedly more than three possible combinations of answers to
the seven questions of value listed in Table 1. Some readers, for example,
may prefer the police justice model without the presumption of guilt and
moral worth. Yet, these three models may pose the most realistic policy
options. The first is already the law dejure, the second the law de facto, and
the third appears to have the strongest support from police experts. 40 It is
not an idle exercise, then, to consider the implications of experiments in
police discretion through the value lenses of these three models. Table 2
summarizes those implications.
TABLE 2
IMPLICATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE OF CONSEQUENCES OF POLICE
ACTIONS BY VALUE MODEL OF POLICE WORK
Model of Police Work State of Knowledge
Ignorance Equity Differentiation
Ministerial Justice Irrelevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
Police Justice License for Helpful, but Largely unusable, a threat
discrimination not mandatory to general deterrence;
guide to action supportive of preferences
based on moral worth
Professional Crime Unacceptably Mandatory Helpful, perhaps mandatory
Control dangerous guide to action guide to action except for
constitutionally protected
categories
39. Moreover, as a recent review of the deterrence literature argues, specific deterrent effects
may comprise a large portion of what are presumed to be general deterrent effects, given the rela-
tively small size and repeated sanctioning of the population of offenders. Lempert, Organizing for
Deterrence: Lessons from a Study of Child Support, 16 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 513, 515 (1981-82).
40. See, e.g., supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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V
IMPLICATIONS OF IGNORANCE
Of the three classes of knowledge about police-citizen encounters, 4' igno-
rance-an absence of experimental data on the consequences of police
action-is the status quo and is likely to remain the largest category for some
time to come. This state of affairs is not troublesome from the viewpoint of
the ministerial model. It provides a convenient justification for the police jus-
tice model's discrimination according to moral worth. From the perspective
of the professional crime control model, however, ignorance poses an ethi-
cally unacceptable risk of doing more harm than good.
The state of knowledge about consequences is irrelevant to the ministerial
model: the law says what acts are crimes and all crimes should be followed by
arrests until the legislature says otherwise. The ministerial model might grant
that knowledge of consequences could be useful in guiding legislative deci-
sions about how police should deal with various crime and order problems,
but the model cannot incorporate knowledge into police decisions. Police are
supposed to make only an evidentiary decision: is there probable cause to
believe a person committed an offense sufficient to justify an arrest?
Ignorance is a convenient state of knowledge for the police justice model
because it helps to legitimate police discrimination according to assessments
of moral worth. Prosecutors and judges do not know the consequences of
their decisions for either the specific deterrence of the offender or the general
deterrence of the community, let alone the effects of such decisions on victims
and witnesses. Nonetheless, they bear the mantle of professionalism to justify
their making of such decisions. Their professionalism invests them with the
right to determine what is just in a particular case, the right to make the pun-
ishment "fit" both the crime and the criminal. With no data to show that such
retributivist actions may conflict with utilitarian considerations of crime con-
trol, the only embarrassment the lawyers suffer is from disparity in punish-
ments administered within and between different courts. Police can avoid
even that appearance of disparity by making low visibility decisions without a
reviewable record.42 Without knowledge that would contradict their deci-
sions, the police, as professional dispensers of justice, are justified in playing
God.
The professional crime control model, in contrast, equates ignorance of
police effects with ignorance of the effects of a new drug. Neither should be
put into widespread practice without careful experimental testing. The fact
that police discretion predates the rise of the scientific method seems irrele-
vant, for there is no "grandfather clause" in the obligation to do no harm.
Leeching and ice baths predate scientific medicine, and they failed to survive
scientific testing. Whether police are using similarly wrongheaded strategies
can be answered only by research.
41. See supra p. 68.
42. See Goldstein, supra note 11, at 552-54.
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Police interventions in citizens' lives are powerful treatments, potentially
affecting life and death in both the short and long run. Like parenting,
policing is a social intervention that seems so intuitive that anyone can do it
well. Social interventions lack the mystery of chemical and surgical interven-
tions. Yet, the commonsense view masks the complexity of the causal rela-
tionships involved.
To be sure, even in medicine there is debate about how much knowledge
is required before a treatment should be used. Both police and doctors share
the ethical obligation to try to do something about a problem, even if the
something is merely likely, but not certain, to be helpful. It is this obligation
that led one doctor to keep a young girl dying of encephalitis alive by giving
her isoprinosine, an untested and unapproved drug. 43 It is this obligation
also that led doctors to prescribe diethylstilbesterol (DES) to 900,000 preg-
nant women from 1955 to 1973, in order to lower their rate of miscarriages.
Early, uncontrolled research had suggested the drug would have that benefit.
Later, controlled research showed that the benefit was illusory and that chil-
dren born of mothers taking the drug had higher rates of cancer. 4 4 The
debate in medicine continues even though "[t]he randomized controlled
clinical trial (RCT) has become the accepted standard for demonstrating the
therapeutic effects in evaluating most forms of treatment. ' ' 45 Some doctors
feel it is wrong to withhold potentially beneficial drugs from patients ran-
domly assigned to a control group, especially where there are no known
harmful side effects. Few doctors, however, would advocate using drugs that
had not been tested by any kind of research.
The current state of ignorance in police discretion is worse than medical
ignorance of the effects of untested drugs. Ignorance in police discretion
allows dispensing totally untested treatments on the basis of race, age, sex,
and demeanor. It may compound the discriminatory aspects ofjustice by pro-
ducing more unintended long-term effects (like increased violence) within one
racial group than within another. If, for example, the results of the Minneap-
olis spouse assault experiment may be generalized (which limitations in
research design and sample size prohibit), the reported reluctance of police in
some communities to arrest blacks in domestic assaults may have increased
the risks of danger to black victims. If the police are to be professionals in
crime control, they must not go on treating situations and people in ignorance
of such effects.
43. Doctors Debate Use of Controlled Studies to Test Effectiveness of New Treatments, Wall St. J., Aug. 12,
1982, at 21, col. 4.
44. Id.
45. Spodick, Randomized Controlled Clinical Trials: The Behavioral Case, 247 J. AM. MED. A. 2258,
2258 (1982), quoted in Doctors Debate Use of Controlled Studies to Test Effectiveness of New Treatments, supra
note 43.
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VI
IMPLICATIONS OF EQUITY
Police research could, hypothetically, develop a body of knowledge con-
sisting largely of equitable implications. Like the spouse assault experiment,
other research could find that there is one treatment that works best on virtu-
ally everyone. This situation would also be similar to that in medicine, in
which most treatments work for most people except for a small percentage of
the population with adverse reactions to medicines (such as, for instance,
those few people who are allergic to penicillin). One can imagine a set of
equity findings: arrest works best for spouse assaults, mediation works best
for bar fights, taking kids home works best for juvenile noise problems, but
juvenile burglars should be diverted to pretrial restitution programs.
Once again, the ministerial model would interpret such findings as inter-
esting for the legislatures and irrelevant to the police. If prosecuting of juve-
nile burglars only makes them commit offenses at a higher rate, then the
prosecutor, not the police, should use that information.
The police justice model finds such information helpful, but hardly a
binding guide to action. Minneapolis police officers who conducted the
spouse assault experiment told the news media that the results of the research
would not alter the way they handled domestic cases. "Every case is different.
You can't generalize," went the familiar refrain. 46 This is not so much an
antipositivist sentiment as an assertion of the right to retain discretion to vary
their actions for reasons other than crime control. Some people deserve pun-
ishment and others may not, regardless of crime control. The information
from such research may tip the balance in borderline cases, but it hardly
changes the basic assumption with which police approach their cases.
The police justice model of police work will pose a major obstacle to
immediate implementation of any new policies based on the results of
research. The Minneapolis police chief has already issued an order calling for
arrests in most cases of domestic assault. The prior practice had been to
arrest only in rare circumstances when someone really "deserved" it. Moving
an entire patrol force to change its discretion patterns may require much
more than an order.
If police officers were socialized into accepting the professional crime con-
trol model of police work, however, they would readily accept the findings of
such experiments as an obligatory guide to practice. If cancer treatment
experiments consistently showed that chemotherapy produced higher survival
rates than radiation for all kinds of people, oncologists would probably feel
bound to prescribe chemotherapy. They could be sued for malpractice if they
tried to vary the recommended treatment according to the race, age, sex, or
"moral worth" of the patient (unless there was an interaction effect between
those variables and the chemotherapy treatment). Similarly, as police "mal-
46. Meeting of domestic violence project police officers, Spring Hill Conference Center,
Wayzata, Minn. (April 6, 1984).
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practice" suits increase in number around the United States, it is conceivable
that expert witnesses, citing the findings of research, could convince juries
that police committed malpractice in failing to be guided by those findings.
There have already been many suits against police for failing to arrest
domestic assailants; 47 experimental evidence supporting the crime control
benefits of making such arrests will make such cases even stronger. Indeed,
one reason police may prefer the ignorance of the police justice model is that
it reduces their vulnerability to such lawsuits.
Any police officer committed to the goal of crime control through specific
deterrence would find it unconscionable to fail to follow consistent research
findings. One may argue about the number of experiments in different set-
tings needed to make the evidence persuasive, but once the evidence becomes
persuasive, police should no sooner disregard it than they should help
inmates escape from prison.
In many ways, equity is the least troublesome scenario. With equitable
policy implications of research, police can control crime without running
afoul of constitutional problems. The equity scenario, however, seems also
the least likely to develop in the long run, despite the convenience of the
medical analogy. The chemical makeup of the human body appears to be
more homogeneous than the socio-genetic makeup of human behavior. Just
as social behavior apparently varies more widely than the internal functioning
of the human organism, the treatments necessary to affect that behavior may
have to vary more as well in order to be effective.
VII
IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENTIATION
Perhaps the more likely scenario for the development of experiments in
police discretion is an accumulation of findings of differentiation. If experi-
ments are done with large enough sample sizes, the chances of finding dif-
ferent actions to be effective for different types of people seem to be rather
good. One can imagine this set of findings: arrest works to deter employed
male bar fighters under age thirty, but the best treatment for employed males
over thirty is driving them away from the scene. Indeed, the complexity of
such findings suggests an approach that is almost Orwellian in appearance.
Nevertheless, that approach would put science to its most effective use in
crime control.
The findings of a police actions experiment employing a large size sample
can easily be transformed into software for microcomputers. Police in many
cities already have mainframe computer terminals in their cars. By whatever
hardware arrangements seem appropriate, police could easily use the software
to obtain an advisory opinion on the basis of past research about what to do
47. See, e.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) (§ 1983 action
alleging violation of equal protection in that arrest decisions made by police gave less protection to
women abused by husbands and boyfriends than to other women).
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with a particular suspect. By asking the suspect questions that appear on the
computer screen and punching in the answers, the officer could fill in the
numbers to the preprogrammed equations predicting the likely post-
encounter effects of police actions on suspect behavior. The equations could
also include cost data to weigh against benefits, so that even if benefits could
be predicted from one course of action, the cost-benefit ratio might lead the
equation to flash on the screen a recommendation against taking that action.
The concept of computer-aided police discretion is a very likely result of
the department store shoplifting experiment. A store security office offers
ideal conditions for gathering information from the suspect (e.g., age,
education, church attendance, community activities), entering the data, and
reading a recommendation to arrest or not calculated from an equation based
on the store's labor costs of prosecution. Given the wide discretion to arrest
exercised in many other areas of this country's booming private policing
industry, the computer-aided approach will initially be more common in that
sector than among public police. The reason follows our three models: busi-
ness is not in the business of meting out justice. The business of business is
making money, and to avoid losing money its security directors pursue a clear
goal of crime control.
To be sure, many store security officers share the police justice model and
the urge to punish the offenders they catch. They describe their own use of
discretion in the familiar terms of public police: sympathy for the elderly
shoplifter and lenience for the very young, anger at the resistant suspect and a
sense of challenge engendered by the "professional shoplifter." 4  Their
arrest decisions are often viewed as a dispensing of justice. In contrast to
public police officers, however, private security officers cannot afford such
arrogation of power if their management disallows it. Without civil service or
union contract protection, security officers can be fired at will. If management
says to use a computer program to make arrest decisions, the officers will
probably do so. 49
The ministerial model again finds all these developments irrelevant. The
police justice model would find these developments most troublesome, since
they seem to undermine general deterrence. Letting people go just because
those individuals cannot be deterred would not make sense if it produced a
net increase in total crime. If the perceived likelihood of arrest for a given
offense were to decline with any of these decisionmaking aids, it could
encourage previously deterred nonoffenders to begin offending. Given the
primacy of general over specific deterrence in the police justice model, such a
consequence would be unacceptable.
Such consequences would also be unacceptable to the professional crime
48. Interviews with 90 store security officers in a major midwestern department store (August,
1983).
49. Curiously, the ministerial model has no objection to this development in private policing.
Since private police have the legal status of citizens deciding whether to report a crime, there is no
legal impropriety to the discretion. Since there generally is no obligation to report crimes, citizens
are free to use whatever criteria they choose to make that decision.
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control model, but that model would impose a higher standard of proof
before reaching a conclusion. The general deterrent effects of arrest deci-
sions made for specific deterrence purposes is a question amenable to
research. Randomly chosen department stores. using such software could, for
example, be monitored, and their loss rates could be compared with the loss
rates of those stores assigned to a control group not using the software. If
there were no differences, the hypothesized loss of general deterrence claim
could be disproved. Since arrest-to-crime ratios are already so low for
so many crimes, it seems unlikely (but possible) that restructuring arrest
decisions according to research on specific deterrence would reduce whatever
general deterrence effects the arrest now produces.
The professional crime control model welcomes any refinement of knowl-
edge about what works. Differentiation of police actions by personal charac-
teristics would make the use of police "tools" of action more precise and
effective. Nevertheless, a professional crime control model cannot tolerate
decisions based on constitutionally forbidden considerations. Under the four-
teenth amendment, an equation for deciding whether public police should
make an arrest must exclude race, national origin, and religion. 50 Private
police probably would not be barred from using an equation with those vari-
ables, at least not under the current case law defining their legal status.5 1 Pri-
vate police, however, would face an ethical problem in officially endorsing the
use of factors that our nation has long deemed legally irrelevant.
No matter what model of police work is used, the inequity of police actions
based on differential deterrability is ethically questionable. Even without the
constitutionally protected factors in an equation, it seems unfair to punish
people on the basis of their employment status, their frequency of church
attendance, their marital status or home situation, or whether their parents
were divorced. Many of these factors may even correlate with the constitu-
tionally protected factors.
The unfairness may be worse. If the control theory of crime 52 is correct,
and if it interacts with sanctions so that more socially bonded people are more
deterrable, then the unfairness will seem great indeed. Those who would be
most highly recommended for arrest would be those most involved with
church, family, community organizations, and the labor force. Those least
likely to be recommended for arrest would be the marginal characters of low
"moral worth" that police love to punish: the unemployed, unmarried,
nonchurchgoing riffraff. One could characterize arresting respectable per-
sons as doing them a favor if the arrest really deters them from further crime.
It is unlikely, however, that they would be grateful for the favor.
The question of differentiation as social policy is increasingly common as
scientific knowledge increases. The different pension benefits for males and
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
51. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
52. See generally T. HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY 16-34 (1969) (the control theory sees
crime as the result of a lack of a bond between an individual and society).
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females based on different life expectancies is one example in which research
suggested a policy with disparate effects, but the courts would not accept it. 53
Genetic screening for predispositions to occupational and other diseases is
another example. 54 Such screening offers potentially enormous benefits by
giving people early warnings of their predispositions to cardiovascular dis-
ease, cancer, and other killers. It also raises ethical questions about the uses
to which such information should be put: whether employers should have a
right to obtain genetic data related to occupational diseases, for example.
Such developments may prompt attacks on science for learning too much,
producing dangerous knowledge that allows managers and other powerful
people to manipulate the lives of the weak.
An additional problem is that science will still have learned too little. At
best, experiments can only point out probabilities-not certainties-of different
individual reactions to police actions. The problem of false positives (people
who are shown by the data probably to be deterrable but turn out not to be)
and false negatives (people who are probably not deterrable but who actually
could be) compound the inequities even more. Prediction in any individual
case can always be in error. This unavoidable statistical property means that
people would not only be arrested on the basis of their personal characteris-
tics, but also on the basis of an imperfect prediction about the effect of those
characteristics in shaping their reactions to arrest or nonarrest. This raises
further questions about what level of false positives should be acceptable:
none? five percent? fifteen? twenty-five? Each of these levels comprises a
different value judgment about how much harm should be inflicted in order to
accomplish good.
In that sense, the people in the pool of differentially treated suspects are
responsible for putting themselves at risk of such treatment. The formulas
did not (apparently) commit the offenses. These people are already vulner-
able to arbitrariness and caprice. The question is whether experimental
results would replace capriciousness with something better, or with dan-
gerous knowledge that would create something even worse.
VIII
CONCLUSION
Do experiments in police discretion produce dangerous knowledge when
they show differential effects of arrest, or do they provide a boon that allows
police to avoid wasting resources and doing more harm than good? The
experiments will probably provide both. Whether the benefits outweigh the
harms will depend on exactly how such knowledge is used.
It is possible that the results of the experiments will be completely
ignored. Despite the high level of press attention accompanying the publica-
53. See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
54. See New Gene Probes May Permit Early Predictions of Disease, Wall St. J., Dec. 23, 1983, at 11,
col. 1.
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tion of these experiments, it seems likely that in the short run police will pay
little attention to them. Those findings that are not too complex to be
remembered easily-especially the equitable ones-will probably become part
of the police academy and college curricula; in a generation police officers
may accept the findings as common wisdom. Those findings that are too com-
plex to remember without the help of a computer terminal and a software
program will live or die depending on the policy decisions that are made
about such technological approaches to police work. Private security may
move slowly in that direction over the next decade, public police not until the
next century.
Scholars conducting experiments in police discretion must face several
questions now: Do we want these developments to occur? Should we help
them to develop? And if they do, should we try to control their direction?
There are no morally satisfactory answers to these questions, for they
present a three-way dilemma to anyone who adheres to a professional crime
control model for police action. To do nothing to relieve the state of igno-
rance about the consequences of police action is unsatisfactory for two rea-
sons. First, it helps justify the continuing discrimination in the exercise of
police discretion. (Arguably there are ways to cure that problem other than
creating knowledge about consequences, but no one has demonstrated any.)
Second, a more compelling reason why the status quo is unsatisfactory is that
police may be doing so much harm unknowingly. "The only alternative to
experimenting with people is to fool around with people ' '55 with unknown
effect.
It would be nice if the experiments would all produce equitable policy
implications, showing no interaction effect between police action and type of
person affected. Scientists could even create this optimal solution by not
searching for interaction effects. A conscious decision not to test for interac-
tions, however, would be almost as dangerous as not testing at all. Suppose
that arresting Hispanic men for spouse assault doubled the rate at which they
subsequently committed homicide, while it cut the rate in half for black and
Anglo males. It would be irresponsible for a scientist to say that arrest works
best for everyone without at least looking for any such backfiring effects within
subgroups.
The discovery of such findings (if they occur) is unsatisfactory because
they imply a formal policy of unequal treatment according to personal charac-
teristics. Unlike the current informal, low-visibility police practices which do
the same thing, a formal policy makes a symbolic statement legitimating dif-
ferential treatment as a principle; the reason is irrelevant.
The dilemma, however, cannot be avoided. Society must choose between
two unsatisfactory practices. One is not doing such experiments, thereby
helping to perpetuate particularistic assessments of moral worth as the prin-
55. PANEL ON RESEARCH ON REHABILITATIVE TECHNIQUES, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE REHA-
BILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 71 (1979) (quoting Frederick Mosteller).
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ciple of differentiation in police discretion. Whether or not police are igno-
rant of the consequences, they will continue to arrest some people and not
others who are legally vulnerable to arrest. If only because of scarce
resources, there will continue to be differential treatment of legally compa-
rable individuals. Without any scientific data as an alternative, the whim and
prejudice of an officer will guide that differentiation.
The other choice, and perhaps the preferable one, is to generate as much
knowledge about differential effects as possible. This knowledge could con-
tend with the prejudices now guiding police discretion and perhaps redirect
them. It can have that effect immediately in private policing. If constitution-
ally protected classes are left out of equations for anything except violent
crime (for which it might be worth a more careful balancing analysis of a
victim's right to equal impact of law compared to a suspect's right to equal
treatment), then there is little that is legally controversial about such uses of
experimentally derived knowledge.
Some might argue that the ministerial approach is still the best solution.
Create full enforcement and there will be no discrimination to counteract or
replace. The law will be truly just and equitable in its application. The
problem is that the law may not be equitable in its consequences. If the tools
of science can demonstrate how law may be used more effectively to create a
better society for all, can we not be bold enough to rethink the legal basis for
the ministerial model? Or can we not be realistic enough to accept differenti-
ation as inevitable, and that the only question is how differential treatment is
to be guided?
In either case, the implication for the role of science is clear. The experi-
ments should be done and the results put to the best use possible, despite the
tragic consequences and inequities of treatment they may produce. Com-
pared to the status quo, this choice provides a much better public policy.
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